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INTRODUCTION
It may simply be too early to tell what impact, if any, theFraud Act 2006 has had; its provisions do not applyretrospectively, which means that only conduct which
has taken place entirely since January 15, 2007 can be
prosecuted under the new provisions. If we factor in the
length of time which investigations and prosecutions
typically take, it is obvious that the first major trials are only
likely to be before the courts in the coming months. There
is then a further delay, of course, until any cases are heard
in the appeal courts, meaning there is a paucity of reported
cases, as well as a significant delay in the publication of any
useful prosecution and conviction statistics.
I would ask instead, what impact can the Act be
expected to make? What are the problems and what were
the solutions, both in theory and in practice, based on
what little anecdotal evidence there is? I will therefore
consider:
• problems with the “old” law;
• whether the Act can solve these problems;
• that case law under the Act which does already exist;
• prosecutorial attitudes towards the Act;
• defence perspectives on the Act; and finally
• other recent measures which may have an impact on
fraud.
THE OLD LAW
The problems with the old law have been rehearsed
many times before; the Fraud Act was the response to long
and sustained criticism from the judiciary, practitioners
and academics.
The overriding criticism of the law as it then stood was
that there were too many specific fraud offences, defined
with reference to different types of consequences and it
was not always easy to identify which offence to charge, and
often, even less easy to secure a conviction. This in turn
led prosecutors, wherever possible, to a rely heavily upon
the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud.
The specific nature of the law invited technical
arguments. The prime example of the problem arose in
1996 when section 15 of the Theft Act 1968 (obtaining
property belonging to another by deception) came under
judicial scrutiny in the case of Preddy [1996] AC 815. The
case concerned good old fashioned mortgage fraud in
which the defendants had obtained mortgages from lenders
on the basis of false representations.
The Court of Appeal held that where D dishonestly, and
by deception, procured a transaction whereby V’s bank
account was debited and consequently there was a credit to
D’s account, D had not obtained property belonging to
another by deception. The debt owed by V’s bank to V had
been extinguished, and what D obtained was a newly
created debt owed by his bank to him, not property
belonging to another. One chose in action had been
extinguished and another created; although a chose in
action is capable of being appropriated by another, here
there were two separate legal rights, not a single piece of
property. This is fine from a jurisprudential point of view
and very neat logical thinking, but a disaster in Magistrates’
and Crown Courts throughout the country.
The introduction of the new section 15A to the Theft
Act 1968 by the Theft (Amendment) Act 1996 followed
very swift consultation on the issue. Fears ran out across
the legal and banking worlds that those “appropriating”
bank balances were now immune from prosecution since
no offence in the criminal calendar was able to tackle the
behaviour. Section 15A, which created a new offence of
obtaining a money transfer by deception, was intended to
close the Preddy loophole, by removing the requirement to
show that property “belonging to another” was obtained,
in that as long as a balance was transferred as a result of the
deception it did not matter that it was not the same legal
property that was obtained.
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However, even this solution demonstrated the very
problem from which our criminal law suffered, namely that
piecemeal reform did nothing to tackle its over-technical
nature and instead exacerbated the problem of too many,
over-specific offences. For example, the 1968 Act had
already been amended by the Theft Act 1978 which
created new offences of obtaining services by deception,
evasion of a liability by deception, and making off without
payment. The Theft Act 1968 had itself been an attempt
to codify and simplify a complex web of offences created
by the Larceny Act 1916. It is almost as if legislators have
a long and distinguished history of over-complication in
this area.
There were also difficulties with charging attempts. D
attempts to get a bank cashier to hand over money from an
account; the cashier is suspicious and refuses: D does not
during this stage of the process stipulate how he would like
the transaction effected. Had the deception worked, and
depending upon what D had intended to go on to say, the
cashier could have either given cash, a cheque or
transferred money between accounts. There was certainly
an attempt, but of which offence?
The same could be said for conspiracies, although there
are the authorities to the effect that an agreement to
commit either one or another crime, although unlikely, is
possible: Hussain [2002] 2 Cr App R 26.
All these were certainly issues, but the most acute
problem which the Fraud Act 2006 was intended to
remedy was the focus on the mind of the victim, rather
than the mind of the offender. Under the old law it was
necessary to prove that the deception had acted on the
victim, for example that he/she would not have parted with
the goods but for the deception. This increasingly created
difficulties as technology developed and the use of credit
cards and payment through machines or over the internet
became prevalent.
If, for example, payment is made by credit card with the
vendor receiving payment immediately from the card
issuer, it may be that the vendor does not really care
whether or not the purchaser had authority to use the card
and does not give the matter any thought. Although the
House of Lords held that it was possible to infer that the
merchant did not wish to be a party to a fraud on the card
issue, and therefore that the deception could be inferred
(Charles [1977] AC 177 and Lambie [1982] AC 449), what
would happen if the merchant gave evidence that he did
not care? This was a tactic defence practitioners often
deployed (myself included): cross examination of the
victim to demonstrate that they gave no thought what so
ever to the question of representations, express or implied,
and therefore any misrepresentation did not “operate”
upon their mind and hence the property was not obtained
as a result of any deception.
There was also the problem that a machine, such as a
ticket machine at a railway station, does not have a “mind”,
cannot think and therefore cannot be deceived: Holmes v
The Governor of Brixton Prison and another [2004] EWHC
2020.
A further problem resulting from the focus on the mind
of the victim rather than the offender was that, although a
failure to disclose may be as harmful and culpable as
making a representation, it was difficult for prosecutors to
successfully imply a representation from silence. People in
positions of trust do not need to make false
representations to get what they want. They can simply
misuse what they have been entrusted with. A well known
example is that of the manager of a pub who sold his own
beer on his employer’s premises; he was not guilty of theft
and was not guilty of conspiracy to defraud, because he
was acting alone: AG’s Ref (No 1 of 1985) [1986] QB 491.
However, two employees who sold their sandwiches in
place of British Rail ones were guilty of conspiracy to
defraud, as they acted together: Cooke [1986] AC 909.
The law created an anomalous situation in which an act
was capable of prosecution when carried out by more than
one person, but not when carried out by someone acting
alone.
Other problems included the fact that fraud (in the lay
sense) is not always committed with an obvious view to
gain. There was no offence of obtaining services without a
deception, so jumping over a turnstile at a football match
could not easily be charged. In addition to offences
involving an element of deception or “fraud” in the
everyday sense, the Fraud Act 2006 was also designed to
deal with other specific lacunae in the existing law such as
these. The offence of going equipped to steal only applied
if the person was found with the necessary equipment
outside their own home, meaning it was legal to have, for
example, skimming devices at home. Fraudulent trading
needed a corporate entity: there was a potential injustice
where a fraudster sought to give the appearance that he was
trading through a company but did not go through any of
the formalities of acquiring one.
Having noted these elements of the Fraud Act 2006 I am
afraid I must pass over them when considering whether the
Act as a whole has had any impact of fraud and instead I
will focus on fraud in the more everyday sense.
PROBLEMS SOLVED?
The new Act, which arises out of the Law Commission
Report of 2002, goes back to the pre-1968 idea that it is
not what the result of conduct is, or its effect on the victim,
which is important, but rather the intention of the
fraudster and what he/she actually did.
The Act repeals all the deception offences in the Theft
Acts of 1968 and 1978 and replaces them with a single
offence of fraud (s 1), with a maximum sentence of 10
years imprisonment, which can be committed in three
different ways by: 11
Amicus Curiae Issue 75 Autumn 2008
• false representation (s 2);
• failure to disclose information when there is a legal
duty to do so (s 3); or
• abuse of position (s 4).
The idea of having one offence of fraud, which can be
committed in three ways, seeks to sweep away the
technicalities which beset the old law by capturing the base
elements of fraud, but in a manner which is deliberately
not attached to any specific activity. This is intended to
overcome the difficulties as to charging and to “future-
proof ” the law, by avoiding over-specificity and allowing it
to keep pace with developing technology.
In each case, the defendant’s conduct must be dishonest
and his intention must be to make a gain, or cause a loss or
the risk of a loss to another. That is the sum total of the
evidential requirements. Crucially, no actual gain or loss
needs to proved.
The Act also creates new offences of possession of (s 6),
and the making or supplying of (s 7), articles for use in
fraud. By virtue of section 9, the offence of fraudulent
trading (s 458 of the Companies Act 1985) will now apply
to sole traders, partnerships and others “carrying on … a
business.” Obtaining services by deception is replaced by
a new offence of obtaining services dishonestly (s 11).
The Act does not abolish the common-law offence of
conspiracy to defraud, despite the recommendation from
the Law Commission that it should, on the basis that it was
redundant in the light of the new general offences. It was
retained for pragmatic reasons, in that it was considered at
the time of the Act’s Parliamentary passage that it might
occasionally prove useful and could be the most effective
charge where there were multiple defendants.
The new offence is inchoate in nature, so that what
would have been an attempt under the old law becomes the
complete s1 offence. This removes the problem associated
with proving the causal link between the gain and the
deception. Attempts under the new law are very narrow
and turn on the particular facts: the offender must have
made a mistake of fact, for example, making a statement
believing it to be false, when it is in fact true. It is a
triumph of intention over endeavour.
Having said all that, there are potential problems on the
horizon already given the way in which the Act is drafted.
The claim by Vera Baird QC, the Solicitor-General, that the
Act was “already making a difference ... clarifying as it does
for the first time what ‘fraud’ really means” seems
somewhat puzzling, given that the Act does not in fact
provide a definition of fraud and is extremely general in its
terms. Nor does it define the meaning of “falsity.”
There is an argument that the provisions of the Act are
too general, and have the potential to extend criminal
liability too far, criminalising lying and ignoring moral
subtleties. There is the potential for trivial disputes to be
elevated into criminal matters. Who are to be the
gatekeepers? Policemen? Prosecutors? Magistrates?
Jurors? Court of Appeal judges?
The section 2 offence seems likely to be capable of the
most widespread use when charging, precisely because it is
the broadest, but has it gone too far? For example, under
section 2(5), a representation can arise before it is released
from D’s exclusive control, for example if he has typed a
false representation into a computer, intending to send it
later. He will still have an intention to gain, eventually, and
so would be guilty of the full offence.
Another issue for consideration: unintentional falsity. By
virtue of section 2(2) a statement will be considered false
if “it is untrue or misleading” and “the person making it
knows that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading.” The
often-quoted example of the section’s breadth is that of an
auction house selling a painting as an original, which later
turns out to be a forgery. The art house genuinely believed
that their attribution was correct, but was nevertheless
aware that there is always a risk of error in such situations.
Although the auction house would not have been guilty
under sections 15 or 15A of the Theft Act 1968 of
obtaining by deception, as it had taken reasonable steps
and was therefore not reckless, it would be guilty of the
section 1 offence under the new law. Again, the suggestion
is that the requirement of dishonesty will work to sift out
such marginal cases; indeed some say that the fact that
dishonesty is the central battleground may be the most
significant brake on the expansion of the offences.
Having said that, major worldwide auctioneers are
concerned about this provision. The attitude that
“dishonesty” is everything gives them little reassurance.
What one art expert regards as dishonest may not
necessarily be the same as another art expert, and even if
they both agree that a particular description of an article is
not dishonest from their expert point of view, who is to say
that a jury would agree? How far does the auction house’s
obligation extend? What if one minority expert expresses
a view about the authenticity of the particular piece or its
provenance? Does the auction house have to bring this
single opinion to the attention of potential bidders, in the
face of all other academic opinion? If the auction house is
aware of the opinion, is it dishonest not to refer to it? Is
it dishonest to not look for other points of view even when
there is consensus elsewhere?
Similarly, in terms of wide drafting, under section 6, it is
merely possession of an “article” for use in fraud which is
criminalised, not an article “made or adapted” for use in
fraud. This could include possession of Microsoft Word,
or even a pen and paper. I suspect that we all have about
our person articles which could be “used in connection
with fraud.” When speaking at a seminar organised by
barristers’ chambers 3 Red Lion Court with Professor
David Ormerod in 2007, we both voiced concern in
relation to section 6. “Worry not,” said David Levy,
number two at the Fraud Prosecution Service (a specialist12
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team within the CPS), “you can rely on the wisdom and
discretion of prosecutors not to prosecute such trivial
cases.” I for one do not share his optimism, and in any
event should we have offences on the statute book which
are so absurdly drafted as to criminalise anyone carrying a
pencil in their pocket?
Generally, there is a fear that there is too much pressure
on the concept of dishonesty, which is not defined in the
Act and is intended to follow the use of the Ghosh [1982]
QB 1053 test in theft offences. Yet, in making its
recommendations before the Bill was published, the Law
Commission criticised the offence of theft as being almost
entirely reliant on dishonesty as a concept. In that context,
the introduction of more offences with exactly the same
problem may seem odd.
The Ghosh test has faced sustained academic criticism,
with an argument that it lacks legal certainty and is
effectively retrospective, because it is left to the jury to
consider the defendant’s behaviour with the benefit of
objective hindsight. Some say the approach is potentially
contrary to Article 7 of the European Convention of
Human Rights, although the Fraud Act has been confirmed
as ECHR compliant by both the Home Secretary and the
Attorney-General.
The concept of dishonesty has not previously been the
subject of focused consideration in the context of fraud. It
is likely that the test will require some judicial
interpretation within the framework of the new offence.
Given the scope of the new offences I wonder whether we
will see a return to the pre-Ghosh authorities which
required some sort of moral obloquy to underpin the
“dishonesty.” In the case law pre-Feely [1973] QB 530 the
argument had succeeded that the absence of moral obloquy
entitled the defendant to an acquittal. Feely put pay to that
suggestion, but given the structure of the offences, will the
Ghosh test survive unrevised? Is there a danger that the
retrospective nature of the Ghosh test is capable of causing
injustice in cases of particular practices/industries? Will
the appeal courts have to intervene to exclude from the
offences’ reach behaviour which “everyday standards”
might stigmatise as “dishonest”, but which in the particular
circumstances of the case are not morally culpable?
Consider an over-zealous sales puff which nobody takes
seriously: it might be Ghosh “dishonest” but should it really
amount to fraud?
Not all comment is in the direction that the Ghosh test is
flawed. Some argue that such an approach allows for the
flexibility necessary in a jury system: it allows for us to be
judged by our peers. If, according to their everyday
standards, a jury considers certain behaviour to be
dishonest (and in those circumstances, in the absence of
some particular factor affecting the cognitive functioning of
the defendant, it is hard to see why he/she should not also
know that), then is that not jury trial par excellence? Is
what some see as inconsistency actually flexibility, which
allows justice to be done in each particular case?
THE EMERGING CASE LAW
For the reasons I outlined earlier, only two reported
cases have been decided under the Act, each of which turns
on very specific facts. If the design of the Act is achieved,
this may well remain the case; the simplicity is intended to
move the law away from the technicalities and arguments
which have dogged the old offences. Somehow, I doubt it
will succeed.
The first reported case is Kensington International Limited
v Republic of Congo and others [2007] EWCA Civ 1128, a
decision in the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal, given
on November 7, 2007, which gives guidance on the scope
of section 13 of the Act. The claimant had judgments in
the Commercial Court for over US$110 million against the
Republic of Congo, but was unable to enforce them
because Congo does not maintain substantial assets abroad.
Instead the claimant obtained various orders enabling it to
intercept monies due to be paid by UK companies (joined
as defendants to the proceedings: companies in the Vitol
group) to Congo on contracts to purchase and export
crude oil.
The UK companies sought to rely on the privilege
against self-incrimination in the proceedings, arguing that
in giving evidence to the court to overturn the orders they
and their principals would be exposed to prosecution for
offences of bribery (the common law offence, the Public
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 and the Prevention of
Corruption Act 1906). However, section 13(1) of the
Fraud Act 2006 provides that:
“A person is not to be excused from –
(a) answering any questions put to him in proceedings
relating to property, or
(b) complying with any order made in proceedings relating
to property, on the ground that doing so may
incriminate him or his spouse or civil partner of an
offence under this Act or a related offence.”
Sub-section 2 goes on to provide that any answers shall
not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings
against the maker and sub-section 4 provides that “related
offence” means conspiracy to defraud (the common law
offence which remains good law notwithstanding the new
offences) and “any other offence involving any form of
fraudulent conduct or purpose.”
The UK companies mounted various arguments,
including the contention that corruption offences were not
“related offences” since they did not involve “any
fraudulent conduct or purpose” and that therefore they
were not afforded this statutory protection and instead
could rely upon the general privilege against self-
incrimination. 13
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The court rejected that argument and decided that
corruption was a “related offence” in that, although the
case law demonstrated that dishonesty “as such” did not
need to be proved, the word “corruptly” signifies that the
circumstances in which the gift was given were such that it
had a tendency to corrupt, that is, “to suborn the agent to
disregard his duty and act contrary to the interests of his
principal, thereby causing him harm.” Therefore, the
court concluded, “offering a bribe with the intention that
it be accepted and acted upon involves a form of fraudulent
conduct, or at any rate of fraudulent purpose.”
The court took an expansive view of the meaning of
“fraudulent” and was prepared to include bribery offences
within this definition, notwithstanding long settled case law
that provided that bribery offences do not involve an
element of dishonesty. Although confined on its facts to the
ambit of section 13 of the Act, the case demonstrates that
the court was prepared to re-visit well established
principles in the light of the new framework. This of
course has the potential to lead to inconsistent decisions in
that this case seems to establish that, although the new
fraud offence requires dishonesty to be proved, you do not
need to be dishonest to be fraudulent!
The only other reported case I have been able to identify
is Attorney General’s Reference (No 6 of 2008) [2008] EWCA
Crim 677. This is the first sentencing appeal to arise from
the Act and involved conjoined cases of the possession of
false identity documents. In one of the appeals, a failed
Zimbabwean asylum seeker, who could not be deported
due to political pressure on the government, but was
unable to work in the UK and was unaware of his right to
claim subsistence vouchers, purchased false identity
documents in order to obtain menial employment. In
those extraordinary circumstances, the court upheld a
sentence of six months imprisonment suspended for two
years, with a requirement that the offender undertake 80
hours of unpaid work for the community
It is worth noting that the maximum sentence has risen
by nearly 50 per cent from to 7 years to 10. That would
result in the existing average sentence for fraud offences
increasing from 3 years to 5. Reference was made to
existing guideline authorities for possession of forged
identity documents and so it appears that the fact of a
charge under the Act made little difference to the sentence
imposed.
If and when you come to read the case you may be able
to resolve a puzzle. The judgment refers to charges under
section 51 of the Fraud Act 2006; a puzzle because the Act
is commendably succinct and runs to only 16 sections.
Did the court mean to refer to the section 6 offence of
possession of articles for use in fraud?
PROSECUTORIAL ATTITUDES
Unsurprisingly, the Act was generally welcomed by
prosecuting authorities. It is perceived that substantive
fraud offences have several practical trial advantages,
making them easier, and quicker (cheaper), to investigate
and prosecute successfully, and ultimately lessening the
chances of a successful appeal. If few major trials have yet
to come to court, it does appear that the new law is being
used routinely in the Magistrates’ and Crown Courts for
small-scale offending. According to the Solicitor-General,
the Act has also been welcomed by the police, who are
“reporting that the new offences are easy to understand
and more closely reflect real fraud activity.”
Unofficial figures from the CPS indicate that there has
been a 40 per cent increase in fraud related prosecutions,
a 10 per cent increase in the conviction rate and there are
more guilty pleas in “volume fraud” (small scale but
repeated offending rather than large scale fraud). At the
higher end of the scale the SFO reports that it has only one
active case which may involve Fraud Act offences.
However, there is a sense among prosecutors that the
reality may not be entirely living up to the theory. As there
do not need to be any consequences from the conduct for
the new offences to be made out, it will often not
technically be necessary to call evidence from a victim.
This obviously has the potential to simplify the job of the
prosecutor and shorten the length of a trial. However, the
feeling seems to be that this approach may cause
presentational difficulties with a jury, who will expect to
hear from someone who has suffered as a result of the
crime; the concept of dishonesty in the absence of a loser
may be a hard one to “sell” to the jury. It is also at odds,
it might be noted, with the government’s drive to persuade
the public that fraud should not be considered a
“victimless” crime (consider the comments of the new
Director of the SFO, Richard Alderman, reported in
Accountancy Age on May 15, 2008).
It may therefore still be tactically preferable to prove
that a victim has suffered a loss. The defence will, in any
event, be able to request the evidence of a victim, in order
to attempt to challenge it and thereby disprove dishonesty.
Consider the Jubilee Line case in which the prosecution
did not adduce evidence of gain or loss in its case of
conspiracy to defraud; the defence invited the prosecution
to gather such evidence contending that it went to the
question of the defendants’ intentions. When it was not
produced, the defence argued to the jury that its absence
demonstrated the lack of intent to cause a loss or gain and
therefore an absence of dishonesty.
There is also the fact that the existence and extent of any
consequences of the fraudulent conduct will be central to
the sentencing exercise, as well as to compensation and
confiscation orders: a victim who is not named on an
indictment or in an offence taken into consideration
cannot be compensated by the court. This means that it
will still be necessary in many cases to gather this evidence.
The Sentencing Guidelines Panel is currently considering14
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how sentencing judges should approach cases in which
there is no evidence of loss or gain.
There is also a feeling among prosecutors that the use of
substantive fraud counts may not be able to adequately
reflect the totality of offending in complex cases. This
comment has been made at recent lectures by members of
both the Attorney-General’s Office and the Serious Fraud
Office. The common law conspiracy to defraud charge will
therefore still be attractive and is likely to be continued to
be used; indeed anecdotal evidence from defence
practitioners is that there has been no diminution in the
use of the common law offence at the charging stage. On
any analysis of the statistics, this charge results in a
relatively lower number of convictions. While this may be
a good thing for the defence, it seems to go against the
general desire for efficiency which lies behind this Act.
An interesting point of reference in this context is the
CPS guidance to prosecutors, found on its website
(www.cps.gov.uk/legal/section8/chapter_d.html). It is
clear from the guidance that the CPS is aware of potential
difficulties with the Act, for example the criminalising of
“trade puffs” and possible attempts to use the legislation to
settle what are effectively personal or commercial disputes.
It states that, when considering the public interest test, the
borderline between criminal and civil liability “is likely to
be an issue.”
Where prosecutors have a choice between a charge
under the Act and a charge under the Theft Act, as may
regularly be the case, it seems likely that the former will
often be preferred. The thrust of the guidance is that a
simpler charge is always better, and that the Fraud Act is
generally simple, notwithstanding the difficulties raised
above, because it focuses only on conduct. Thus, a person
who has stolen from their employer is more likely now to
be charged with fraud by abuse of position, rather than
theft by an employee.
DEFENCE PERSPECTIVE
In my view, there is a very real practical significance for
the defence practitioner in the Act’s reliance on dishonesty.
It will be more difficult to advise clients to enter a plea
of guilty, as there is often a “chance with a jury” on
dishonesty; the Act may militate against guilty pleas, which
runs contrary to the government’s desire for speedier and
more efficient justice. It is a good point in mitigation to
say to a judge that it is impossible for legal advisors to give
definitive advice to a client in cases in which the only issue
is whether the accepted conduct is dishonest. Who can
predict with certainty the view the jury will take? In those
circumstances is the client not entitled, just as the judge is,
to leave dishonesty to the jury?
However, the reluctance of appeal courts to overturn
convictions in which the jury made a finding of dishonesty
is well-established. That train of thought leads to this: will
it be better in some cases not to have a jury but instead
have a judicial tribunal of fact (for example in the
stereotypically unpopular professions)? I am not going to
list them for fear of giving offence, but another area in
which trial by judge alone might be attractive is where
there has been widespread critical press coverage in a case
such as the SFO investigation of BAe and the Al-Yammah
contract. I will return to juryless trial later in this article.
Another practical issue for defence practitioners is
whether there will be a need for expert evidence on
practices within a particular profession, to counteract the
allegation of dishonesty, thereby prolonging trials. The
auction house I discussed earlier is an example. If the
capacity for expert evidence to lead trials into complex
corners of particular expertise requires demonstration,
may I commend to you the extraordinarily learned first
instance judgment of Jack J in Thomson v Christie Manson &
Woods Ltd [2004] EWHC 1001 (QB) which concerns the
provenance of a pair of Louis XV porphyry and gilt-bronze
vases.
One more point for consideration – should defence
practitioners encourage use of conspiracy to defraud,
which has a relatively low conviction rate?
OTHER MEASURES TO COMBAT FRAUD
Fraud is a massive and constantly growing problem.
According to figures from the Association of Chief Police
Officers for 2007, its cost including detection and
prosecution is estimated to be approximately £20 billion a
year, or around £330 for every person in this country. It is
obvious then, that the Fraud Act cannot be expected to
solve the problem on its own. The Home Office reports
that 79 per cent of prosecutions for fraud and forgery
offences result in a conviction, but only 10 per cent of such
recorded offences are ever actually prosecuted (making a
conviction rate of 8 per cent for recorded offences, which
in turn are just a drop in the ocean of all frauds). The
reality is that it is not the legislation, but a lack of resources
at an investigatory level which is the real issue; in that
context, the impact of this Act, or any Act, will be limited.
Government Fraud Review
The Government has recognised the problem and the
Government Fraud Review was commissioned by the
Attorney General in October 2005. The final report,
which contained some 62 recommendations was published
in July 2006 and the government then published its formal
response in March 2007. Its conclusion was that anti-
fraud work is fragmented and lacking in co-ordination.
National Anti-Fraud Strategy
The principal recommendation of the Government
Fraud Review was the National Anti-Fraud Strategy. This
is intended to herald a change of attitude, making the
country a hostile environment for fraud, and a move 15
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towards a more pro-active and co-ordinated approach to
the prevention and investigation of fraud. Some £29
million of government funding has been allocated, which is
perhaps relatively modest if the scale of problem is
considered. There are three central “building blocks” to
the strategy:
• The National Fraud Strategic Authority (NFSA) will be
set up, to supplement the efforts of existing
organisations, co-ordinating the fight against fraud.
• The National Fraud Reporting Centre and Intelligence
Bureau (NFRC) will also be created, as a central
contact point for receiving and analysing reported cases
of fraud. This should become fully operational in 2009
and the intention is that it will allow patterns in
offending to be identified which cannot not be spotted
at a local level, resulting in a better allocation of
resources.
• A National Lead Force for Fraud has also been created,
a role which will be taken on by the City of London
police.
Serious Crime Prevention Orders
The Serious Crime Act 2007, which commenced on April
6 2008, introduced the concept of Serious Crime Prevention
Orders – the so called “super ASBOs.” In essence, these are
civil orders, similar to injunctions, which restrain serious and
serial offenders’ business and commercial activities. They
are available to a Crown Court on either conviction or
committal for sentence and can be used for convictions
under sections 1, 6, 7, 9 and 11 of the Fraud Act (as well as
for conspiracy to defraud). The first orders were served in
Northern Ireland on April 22, 2008, on four people who
were the subject of a HM Revenue & Customs prosecution
for revenue evasion in relation to fuel fraud.
The Financial Court
Another recommendation of the Fraud Review was the
establishment of a Financial Court jurisdiction, so that the
different proceedings arising from serious fraud cases, both
criminal and civil, can be brought together in one court.
This would not be a new institution as such, but would
involve extending the jurisdiction of the High Court to
create a “virtual” court sitting in existing courtrooms and
using a specialist group of judges who have experience of,
and familiarity with, financial issues and well developed
case management skills. They would be drawn, not just as
now from Crown Court judges (with presiding High Court
judges taking an occasional fraud case), but also from
amongst High Court judges more generally: from the
Commercial Court, its mercantile judges and possibly even
from the Chancery Division.
This proposal is currently being considered by a working
group, with the aim of producing a full cost/benefit study
by spring 2009. The practical issues relating to the
proposal are legion, so the working group’s
recommendations will be important to consider. As
alluded to earlier, if the idea can be translated into working
practicality there may be circumstances in which the fraud
defendant might welcome the jurisdiction of the Financial
Court, enabling him/her to resolve in an efficient and
consistent way the criminal allegations and civil claims
which almost inevitably follow corporate collapse.
Plea bargaining
On April 3, 2008, the Attorney-General’s office
launched a consultation on the Introduction of a Plea
Negotiation Framework for Fraud Cases in England and Wales.
The consultation arose out of one of the recommendations
of the Fraud Review, which identified advantages in offering
parties to fraud cases the opportunity to reach a court-
sanctioned agreement at an early stage.
In England and Wales, informal post-charge discussions
between the prosecution and the defence already take
place, with varying degrees of success. There is also the
system of “Goodyear” indications, in which defendants can
receive an indication of their likely sentence from the judge
before entering a guilty plea.
This differs from the formal system which exists in the
US and of which the recent Marine Hose case is an example.
In this case of cartel behaviour affecting the US and UK
markets the defendant was able to negotiate a fixed
sentence with US Department of Justice prosecutors in
advance of entering a formal plea in the US. He was then
able to return to the UK, the sentence in the US being
suspended upon condition that it would not be activated if,
following a guilty plea in the UK, the sentence passed here
was equal to or in excess of the US sentence. This would
allow the defendant to serve his sentence in the UK and
avoid two prosecutions. Quite how the defence will
present the case to a Crown Court judge when mitigating
(“you must sentence the defendant to at least four years
…”) remains to be seen, but clearly this coordinated
approach to sentencing has advantages for defence and
prosecution alike.
The consultation sets out a framework for plea
negotiation whereby the parties enter into voluntary pre-
charge discussions with a view to agreeing a basis of plea.
It envisages discussions taking place on the presumption
that nothing said by the suspect could be used against him
in any subsequent proceedings (although a written
agreement to the contrary would be possible). Prosecutors
are expected to comply with their disclosure obligations on
a voluntary basis as the statutory obligations set out in the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 are not
triggered until after charge. The framework includes
guidelines for prosecutors on when to accept a guilty plea.
If accepted, the basis of plea would then be recorded in a
written plea agreement to go before the Crown Court at
the defendant’s first appearance. The judge could accept
or reject the agreement or defer a decision pending further16
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information; he/she could also give an indication of a
maximum sentence.
The consultation ended on June 26, but the proposals
have already attracted criticism and there have been
questions as to whether the framework is actually in the
public interest. Of particular importance is that, as
drafted, the framework does not differentiate between
corporations and individuals. This means that the
unavailability of legal aid pre-charge could leave unfunded
individuals in a position where they do not have access to
independent legal advice.
The FSA is among the prosecuting authorities which
have long been pushing for plea-bargaining in this country,
as it believes, for example, that only by securing evidence
from those inside the ring will it ever be able to secure
convictions for insider trading. There is a view that plea-
bargaining would allow it to reduce the length of cases,
therefore freeing up resources and meaning more cases can
be pursued, whilst lessening the strain of such proceedings
on victims and witnesses. It must also be the case that
there is a hope it will secure convictions in cases where the
success at trial is by no means certain.
However, there are some doubts as to whether plea-
bargaining in this country can actually achieve all this. The
realities of the UK justice system are very different to those
of the US, not least because of the sentencing regime and
the availability of public funding. There will be a carrot but
no stick, and it is hard to envisage the system resulting in,
as it does in the US, people “coming clean” to the
authorities without some sort of push. In addition, given
that the new offences hang so much on dishonesty, which is
a jury issue, it may be, as suggested above, that individuals
are still prepared to take their chances on remaining silent.
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
The Serious Fraud Office has compulsory powers under
section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 to compel the
disclosure of evidence that may be relevant to a current
investigation into serious or complex fraud. The Criminal
Justice and Immigration Act, which received Royal Assent
on May 8, introduces a new section 2A into the 1987 Act,
which allows the director of the SFO to approve the use of
section 2 powers at the vetting stage in cases where it
appears that there may have been a corruption offence
involving a foreign official.
In practice, the provision will allow the SFO to compel
British companies and individuals to provide evidence
about possible corruption abroad, as long as the material is
in the United Kingdom. It is said that corruption abroad
is particularly hard to investigate, as not only are the
potential witnesses many hundreds of miles away and
reluctant to come forward, but the foreign jurisdiction may
well be unable and unwilling to provide information. The
SFO cannot justify commencing a formal investigation
without sufficient information on which to make a decision
as to whether or not such a use of its resources is justified,
and so foreign corruption cases often do not get beyond
the “vetting stage.”
The Law Commission is currently considering the law of
bribery (although the consultation period has now closed).
The proposals are interesting and I suspect represent the
best route forward to reaching a consensus between the
interested parties. I hope that we will see progress, which
has been promised since the Law Commission produced its
first proposals in 1998. I do not have time to consider
these proposals in any depth here (there is a paper on our
website), but in the context of my topic, it is interesting to
note that the proposals make no reference to investigative
powers but do deal with the requirement of consent to
prosecute, which is a related but separate issue. The
consultation paper, which is worth reading in full, also
demonstrates the overlap between what might in lay terms
be considered as corruption and the fraud offence under
the Fraud Act. It remains to be seen whether a newly
drafted corruption offence will overlap with the Act.
Trials without jury
The Fraud (Trials Without a Jury) Bill, which sought to
amend section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, had its
second reading in the House of Lords on March 20, 2007.
It was voted down by the Lords on that occasion and has
not been resurrected. Section 43 of the CJA 2003 allowed
a defendant to elect trial by Crown Court judge alone; the
Bill was drafted to amend the Act by requiring a High Court
judge rather than a Circuit judge to sit in the Crown Court
in such cases; this was seen as a “softener”, but failed to
curry favour with those who oppose trial without jury.
It appears that the government has dropped the plans to
pursue juryless trials in complex fraud cases. If and when
we have a change of government, expect this issue to
resurface. The power is on the statute book, but like so
many reforms in recent years has never been enacted.
CONCLUSION
Although there is plenty to consider in relation to the
prosecution of fraud, in response to the question I have
posed as to whether the Fraud Act has had any impact, I am
afraid my answer has to be that “it is still too early to tell”. A
Home Office review of the operation of the Act is due three
years after its implementation, so if I am asked again in
2010, I may have a better chance of answering the question.
One final thought: if it is right that the Fraud Act turns
out to be an improvement upon the old law theoretically,
but in practice has little impact, is that a result of our
system rather than the black letter law? A development
which I believe may be capable of producing a fundamental
shift in the punishment of fraud carried out in the
commercial/business sector is Part 3 of the Regulatory
Enforcement and Sanctions Bill currently making its way
through Parliament. This is a topic worthy of its own 17
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article, but I invite you to look at it and the reports which
proceeded it, the Hampton Review in 2005 and the
Macrory Review in 2006.
The Bill heralds a new enforcement regime of civil
sanction rather than criminal trial (save in the worst cases);
it is clear the Government has a jealous eye on the revenue
creation enforcement actions of the Department of Justice
and Securities Exchange Commission in the United States.
Although the SFO and CPS do not feature in Schedule 5 to
the Bill, the regulators to be given the new civil powers of
enforcement, the Financial Services Authority, the Office
of Fair Trading, the Health and Safety Executive and the
Environmental Agency are among the prosecutors which
do. We may be witnessing a movement away from the
criminal law as the primary method of regulating conduct
in commerce, in which event legislative changes such as the
Fraud Act may, over time, have less and less effect.
• This article is taken from a lecture delivered at the
Institute of Advanced Studies on May 14, 2008.
Ben Summers
Partner, Peters & Peters
bsummers@petersandpeters.com
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